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THE SUPREME COURT’S MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE “MANIFEST DISREGARD”
DOCTRINE: HOW STOLT-NEILSEN V. ANIMALFEEDS EXPANDS GROUNDS FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRAL AWARDS
By
Matthew C. Weiner*
I.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

A.

Introduction
By enacting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),1 “Congress declared a

national policy favoring arbitration,”2 which creates a desirably efficient,
inexpensive, and expeditious means for dispute resolution.3 Furthermore, we can
see this national policy substantiated by observing the limited ability granted to
courts to review and vacate arbitral awards, which, of course, is needed to
“maintain arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.”4
Congress promulgated three sections within the FAA to limit judicial review of
arbitral awards, §§ 9-11.5 However, we have further seen the rise of common law
grounds to vacate arbitral awards existing under the theories of “manifest disregard
of the law,”6 violations of public policy,7 and arbitrary and capricious
determinations.8 This article will focus on the common law ground of “manifest

*
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1
9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-16 (2010).
2
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
3
See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
4
Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008).
5
See Id.
6
See MCI Constructors, LLC v. City Of Greensboro, 610 F.3d 849, 857 (4th Cir. 2010).
7
See Hicks v. Cadle Co., 355 Fed.Appx. 186, 195 (10th Cir. 2009).
8
See Lifecare Intern., Inc. v. CD Medical, Inc., 68 F.3d 429 (11th Cir. 1995); See also
Hough v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 757 F.Supp. 283, 293 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (While it may be argued that the award does not represent the only set of conclusions
which the evidence might have supported, the award does not appear to be capricious,
arbitrary, manifestly unfair or in violation of public policy).
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disregard of the law” and explain its evolution from Wilko v. Swan9 to Hall Street
Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.10 to its new implicit meaning under the
controversial Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds International Corp.11 Although it
has been consistently stated by the courts that arbitral awards can rarely be vacated
under the theory of “manifest disregard of the law,”12 the new holding in StoltNielsen impliedly expands the doctrine and perhaps erodes the fundamental
essence of arbitration being the “efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious means for
dispute resolution” that was so desirable.
B.

FAA Section Ten
Section Ten of the FAA states grounds from which a federal district court

can decide whether the arbitral award can be vacated.13 An arbitration award may
be vacated by a Federal District Court when: (1) an award is procured by fraud,
corruption or undue means, (2) there is evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, (3) the arbitrators are guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
hearings for sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear pertinent and material
evidence or any other misbehavior which prejudices the rights of any party to the
arbitration, and (4) the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award is not made.14 As to these
statutory grounds, Congress avoids any reference to a substantive basis for review,
which implies that a merits review of an arbitral award is inappropriate.15

9

Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).
Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
11
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds International Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010).
12
See Wallace v. Buttar 378 F.3d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 2004) (The doctrine of “manifest
disregard of the law” is “limited only to those exceedingly rare instances where some
egregious impropriety on the part of the arbitrators is apparent”).
13
9 U.S.C.A. § 10.
14
9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(1)-(4).
15
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND
PRACTICE 79 (Thomson/West 2009).
10
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II.

THE EMERGENCE OF “MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE LAW”

A.

Early Precedents
Perhaps to supplement the statutory grounds and provide for a limited

judicial supervision of the merits of an arbitral award, the common law has
evolved to incorporate the doctrine of “manifest disregard of the law.”16 Although
its use is very limited, the doctrine is invoked most frequently in an attempt to
challenge the enforcement of an award.17
We first see the doctrine stated in dictum in the 1953 Supreme Court case
of Wilko v. Swan.18 In one sentence, the Wilko Court stated, “In unrestricted
submission, such as the present margin agreements envisage, the interpretations of
the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the
federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.”19 Ever since, each
circuit has invoked “manifest disregard” and has come up with its own definition
of what the doctrine entails. Generally speaking, "manifest disregard of the law"
means something more than just error in law or failure on part of the arbitrator(s)
to understand or apply law; it must be clear from the record that the arbitrator(s)
recognized applicable law and then ignored it.20
Accordingly, the standard is very narrow. In the 2000 case, Dawahare v.
Spencer,21 the Sixth Circuit explained, “Since Supreme Court dictum established
the manifest disregard of the law standard forty-seven years ago, only two federal

16

Id. at 81.
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION IN A NUTSHELL 245 (Thomson/West 2009).
18
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-437 (1953), overruled on other grounds, Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
19
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-437.
20
See Carter v. Health Net of California, Inc., 374 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2004).
21
210 F.3d 666 (6th Cir. 2000).
17
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courts of appeals have used it to vacate arbitration decisions.”22 The cases to which
Dawahare was referring were Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc.,23 and
Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc.24 Although there have been instances since
Dawahare that a federal appeals court has vacated an award based on the
doctrine,25 it has been looked upon as a very limited and unusual determination.26
B.

Hall Street Associates and its effect on “Manifest Disregard of the Law”
1.

Hall Street Associates v. Mattel

The subject of manifest disregard has been the topic of much debate since
the recent Supreme Court opinion of Hall Street Associates v. Mattel.27 In Hall
Street, the issue was whether parties could contractually enable a District Court to
vacate an arbitral award where the arbitrator's findings of facts are not supported
by substantial evidence, or where the arbitrator's conclusions of law are
erroneous.28 Essentially, the parties wished to expand the grounds of vacatur
beyond the FAA § 10 and allow the Court to undergo de novo review of the
arbitral award.
The Court did not allow for such an agreement.29 Justice Souter, writing
for the majority, held that grounds for vacatur are “exclusively” within the text of
the Federal Arbitration Act §§ 9-11.30 The Court analyzed the text of the FAA and
22

Id. at 670.
Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997).
24
Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1034
(1999).
25
See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 330 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2003); See also
Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230 (4th Cir. 2006); Coffee Beanery, Ltd. V.
WW, L.L.C., 300 Fed. Appx. 415 (6th Cir. 2008).
26
See Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. Donelson, 473 F.3d 684 (6th Cir. 2007).
27
Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
28
Id. at 579.
29
Id. at 586.
30
Id. at 584.
23
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concluded that §§ 10 and 11 cannot be supplemented, as “it would stretch basic
interpretive principles to expand the stated grounds to the point of evidentiary and
legal review generally.”31 The Court went on to state that §§ 10 and 11 “address
egregious departures from the parties' agreed-upon arbitration.”32 By keeping the
use of vacatur under §§ 9-11 to such “extreme” instances, the Court viewed §§ 911 “as substantiating a national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited
review needed to maintain arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes
straightaway.”33
Naturally, because the “manifest disregard of the law” doctrine is not
authorized from the text, one would be led to believe that the Court wished to
disband the doctrine. However, to create confusion among the circuits, the Court
refused to rule on the survival of “manifest disregard.”34 The Court stated that
“[m]aybe the term ‘manifest disregard’ was meant to name a new ground for
review, but maybe it merely referred to the § 10 grounds collectively, rather than
adding to them.”35 Is the Court stating that only the procedural grounds stated in §§
9-11 are meant to be applied during judicial review? Or, to the contrary, has the
manifest disregard standard survived as an independent ground for merits review,
or perhaps hidden under the meaning of the FAA § 10?
2.

Subsequent Circuit Division Regarding “Manifest Disregard of the
Law”

The circuits have been split in attempting to answer these questions. The
fifth circuit, in Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc. v. Bacon36 stated that Hall Street
“clearly has the effect of further restricting the role of federal courts in the

31

Id. at 586.
Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 589.
33
Id. at 588.
34
Id. at 585.
35
Id.
36
Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009).
32
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arbitration process.”37 By interpreting the FAA as exclusive grounds for vacatur
and modification, the Citigroup Court held that “Hall Street rejected manifest
disregard as an independent ground for vacatur.”38 The court further reasoned that
this ruling was “consistent with the ‘national policy favoring arbitration with just
the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving
disputes straightaway’”39 The first and eleventh Circuits have also both held that
judicially-created bases for vacatur, such as “manifest disregard of the law,” are no
longer valid in light of Hall Street. 40
However, we see a different interpretation of Hall Street in other circuits.
The sixth circuit, in Coffee Beanery, Ltd. V. WW, L.L.C.,41 held that the decision of
Hall Street “did not foreclose federal courts' review for an arbitrator's manifest
disregard of the law.”42 The Coffee Beanery court reasoned that in Hall Street the
holding spoke only to the inability of parties to expand the scope of judicial
review.43 It further stated that in Hall Street the Court acknowledged the possibility
that the term “manifest disregard,” as stated in Wilko, was meant to name a new
ground of review.44 The second and ninth Circuits also continued to use the
manifest disregard doctrine, but they do not believe that the standard is an
additional, independent non-statutory ground for vacatur, but instead a judicial
gloss on the grounds of FAA § 10.45

37

Id. at 350.
Id. at 353.
39
Id. at 353 (citing Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 1405).
40
Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Service, 524 F.3d 120, 124 n. 3 (1st Cir.2008) (“We
acknowledge the Supreme Court's recent holding in [Hall Street] that manifest disregard of
the law is not a valid ground for vacating or modifying an arbitral award in cases brought
under the Federal Arbitration Act.”); Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., LLC, 604 F.3d 1313
(11th Cir. 2010).
41
Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 Fed. Appx. 415 (6th Cir. 2008).
42
Id. at 418.
43
Id. at 419.
44
Id.
45
Telenor Mobile Communications AS v. Storm LLC, 584 F.3d 396, 408 n.6 (2nd Cir.
2009); Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assoc., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, Improv West Assoc. v. Comedy Club, Inc., 130 S.Ct. 145 (2009).
38
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III.

STOLT-NIELSEN AND ITS AFFECT ON “MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE
LAW”

A.

Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds International Corp.
The Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen has recently had the opportunity to

address the confusion between the circuits regarding the application of manifest
disregard, but arguably made it even more ambiguous. In Stolt-Nielsen, the parties’
arbitral clause was silent with respect to whether AnimalFeeds can pursue class
arbitration.46 The parties agreed to submit to arbitrators whether or not class
arbitration could commence with the stipulation that the agreement was in fact
silent.47
The arbitrators found in favor of AnimalFeeds, and Stolt-Nielsen filed an
application to vacate the arbitrators’ award in the District Court for the Southern
District of New York.48 The district court vacated the award, holding that the
award was in manifest disregard “insofar as the arbitrators failed to conduct a
choice-of-law analysis.”49 AnimalFeeds appealed and the second circuit reversed.50
The second circuit held that because Stolt-Nielsen could not cite authority applying
a federal maritime rule of custom and usage against class arbitration, the
arbitrators’ decision could not be in manifest disregard of the law.51
The Supreme Court reversed the second circuit and vacated the arbitrators’
award, ultimately concluding that the arbitrators exceeded their powers under §
10(a)(4) and dispensed their own brand of industrial justice.52 In an opinion written
by Justice Alito, the Court stated that the arbitrators should have applied a
decisional rule derived from the FAA or either maritime or New York law when
46

Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds International Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1765 (2010).
Id. at 1766.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1766.
52
Id. at 1767.
47
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interpreting whether the parties’ contract permits class arbitration.53 Instead, the
panel imposed its own policy choice and thus exceeded its powers.54 Because
arbitration must be consensual and because there was no agreement regarding class
arbitration, “the parties cannot be compelled to submit their dispute to class
arbitration.”55
B.

Analysis
At first glance, it is difficult to understand the grounds on which the Court

vacated the arbitrators’ award. Did the Court use the “manifest disregard of the
law” standard and apply a merits review, did it use the statutory ground of the
arbitrators exceeding their powers under § 10(a)(4), or perhaps did the Court create
a new means of vacating an arbitral award? The Court even declined to consider
whether manifest disregard survives the decision in Hall Street as an independent
ground for review or a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set
forth under § 10.56 However, one can infer from the reasoning the Court applied
that it does not matter how “manifest disregard” survives Hall Street because the
Court conducted a merits review on grounds beyond that of “manifest disregard.”
Regardless of how the Court viewed “manifest disregard,” it paved a new path of
analysis in reviewing arbitral awards, which certainly can have an effect on future
judicial review.
First, I will consider how the court went about analyzing the review as if
solely under the statutory ground of § 10(a)(4). After all, the Court did not refer to
the common law ground of “manifest disregard” once. Furthermore, it claimed that
the panel “exceeded its powers” by imposing its own policy choice when it ruled in
favor of class arbitration.57 Because § 10(a)(4) specifically allows vacatur “where
53

Id. at 1770.
Id.
55
Id. at 1776.
56
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1768 n. 3.
57
Id. at 1770.
54
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the arbitrators exceeded their powers,” it is safe to say that the Court used this
statutory ground as a basis underlying its decision. However, as stated supra,58 §
10 is not a means for a substantive basis review, but rather it is procedural. The
inquiry under § 10(a)(4) is not whether the arbitrators correctly decided that issue,
but rather, whether the arbitrators had the power to decide upon the issue.59 The
arbitrators’ power, of course, is based on the parties' submissions or the arbitration
agreement itself.60 The dissent was certainly aware of this, stating that “[t]he
parties’ supplement agreement, referring the class-arbitration issue to an arbitration
panel, undoubtedly empowered the arbitrators to render their clause-construction
decision. That scarcely debatable point should resolve this case.”61 Obviously, the
arbitrators had the power to decide on the issue, so why did the Court conclude that
the arbitrators exceeded their powers? Did the Court expand the grounds upon
which a court can grant the statutory ground of vacatur? Or perhaps the Court used
the common law doctrine of manifest disregard – without even saying so.
Because it is apparent that the Court went beyond the statutory grounds of
vacatur, the next inquiry is to decide exactly what the Court did to vacate the
arbitral award. What is confusing is that the Court decided that the award should
be vacated under § 10(a)(4), but it conducted a merits review and stated that the
arbitral panel decided the law incorrectly. Essentially, the Court attempted to
squeeze the common law doctrine of manifest disregard into the statutory text of §
10(a)(4). Even still, we can see that the arbitrators did not disregard the law, as the
panel observed the arbitration clause consistent with New York law and with

58

See Carbonneau, supra note 15.
DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 824 (2nd Cir. 1997) See also
Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 17, 121 S.Ct.
462, 467 (2000) (“[Petitioner] does not claim here that the arbitrator acted outside the
scope of his contractually delegated authority. Hence we must treat the arbitrator's award as
if it represented an agreement between [petitioner] and [respondent] as to the proper
meaning of the contract's words…”).
60
DiRussa, 121 F.3d at 824.
61
Stolt-Nielsen at 1780 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
59
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federal maritime law and gauged what it believed to be the parties’ intent with
regards to class arbitration.62
So if the arbitrators had the power to decide on the issue, and further did
not disregard the law, then why was the award vacated? Ultimately, the Court did
not agree with the arbitrators’ analysis in viewing that Bazzle v. Green Tree
Financial Corp. controlled63 and further felt that arbitrators cannot compel class
arbitration absent a contractual basis to do so.64 Because class arbitration and
bilateral arbitration are fundamentally different, one may not infer that the parties
intended class-action arbitration when the agreement is silent.65 Accordingly, the
Court viewed the arbitral award as an attempt of the arbitrators to implement
policy, which “exceeds their powers.”66
Essentially the Court conducted a de novo review of the arbitrators’
decision and concluded that they committed legal error. By disregarding prior
means of vacating arbitral awards, i.e. manifest disregard of the law or the
procedural grounds stated in § 10, the Court impliedly dictated a new means by
which an arbitral award can be vacated. Although the arbitrator has the power to
decide upon a legal issue that the parties agreed to submit to arbitration, it seems as
if the Court will now vigilantly watch and vacate awards that stray too far from
acceptable legal reasoning.
IV.

CONCLUSION
After Solt-Nielsen, one can make a plausible argument as to the death of

the manifest disregard doctrine. After all, Stolt-Nielsen did not appeal to the

62

Id. at 1781 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1770.
64
Id. at 1775.
65
Id. (“[B]ecause class-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a
degree[,] it cannot be presumed the parties consented to [class arbitration] by simply
agreeing to submit their disputes to an arbitrator”).
66
Id. at 1767-68.
63
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doctrine once in its opinion and nevertheless conducted a more lenient merits
review under a procedural statutory ground of FAA § 10(a)(4). Therefore, there
would be no purpose of appealing to the manifest disregard doctrine because there
is already a more lenient statutory merits review route available under the FAA.
Although logically sound, that reasoning has not necessarily been adopted by the
lower federal courts as we still see the doctrine invoked to date.67
Nevertheless, it is still troubling how the Supreme Court conducted a
merits base review and then concluded that the arbitrators “exceeded their powers”
under § 10(a)(4). Not once did the Court appeal to the common law manifest
disregard doctrine, but rather it consistently invoked the statutory text – which is
not meant to call for a merits review. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly,
it appears that the Court conducted de novo review and simply found error in the
panel’s reasoning. Nowhere in the opinion did the Court state how the panel knew
of the applicable law, and then ignored it. With this ruling, the Court potentially
opened the door for easier possibilities of vacatur and placed a higher power upon
courts to review arbitral awards. With disgruntled parties more prone to seek
judicial review, the underlying inexpensive and expedient nature of arbitration is
thus jeopardized.

67

See Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 607 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2010); See also
Paul Green School Of Rock Music Franchising, LLC. v. Smith, Slip Copy, 2010 WL
2993835 (3d Cir. 2010) (“an arbitrator will not be found to have manifestly disregarded the
law for alleged errors in its application”)

